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Does peacekeeping only work in easy environments?
An analysis of conﬂict characteristics, mission proﬁles,
and civil war recurrence
Thorsten Gromes
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ABSTRACT
Peacekeeping is widely considered to be an eﬀective means of preventing civil
war recurrence. However, as peace has collapsed in a considerable number of
cases despite peacekeeping eﬀorts, we are left with the question which
combinations of peacekeeping environments and peacekeeping missions lead
to lasting peace. This article compares 22 peacekeeping missions between
1990 and 2012. While prominent United Nations documents assume that the
success of post-conﬂict peacekeeping primarily depends on the features of
the mission itself, the analysis shows that characteristics of the terminated
civil war have a strong inﬂuence on whether peace endures. Restrained
peacekeeping, deﬁned by low troop density, non-robustness, and a lead
nation that is not a permanent member of the Security Council, only succeeds
in preserving peace in conducive environments. Inconclusive war endings,
evenly distributed military capabilities at war’s end, ethnic conﬂicts, and high
intensity create a particularly diﬃcult context for peacekeeping.
KEYWORDS Intrastate conﬂicts; peace processes; peace operations; post-conﬂict peacebuilding;
qualitative comparative analysis
Peacekeeping is widely regarded as an eﬀective instrument for preventing the
resumption of civil war. Walter (2002) argues that the conclusion and
implementation of peace agreements require security guaranties from third
parties—an assurance that peacekeeping missions are able to provide.
Fortna (2008, p. 179) states that “peacekeeping is an extremely eﬀective tool
for maintaining peace.” Numerous studies support these ﬁndings (e.g.,
Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2016, pp. 240–245; Joshi, 2013, pp. 376–
377; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, & Quinn, 2011, pp. 185–187). In recent years,
however, an increasing portion of contributions has found that the eﬀect of
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peacekeeping is not statistically signiﬁcant (e.g., Hegre & Nygård, 2015,
pp. 996–997; Joshi & Quinn, 2015, p. 25; Walter, 2015, pp. 1253–1255). As
civil war has recurred in a considerable number of cases despite peacekeeping
eﬀorts, it is important to investigate which conditions allow peacekeeping
missions to eﬀectively prevent relapses into civil war.
Research on the conditions for peacekeeping success has not kept pace with
studies that have investigated the average eﬀect of peacekeeping missions on
peace survival. The few comparative studies that do exist examine missions
during armed intrastate conﬂicts and deployments prior to and after such
instances of violence (Bratt, 1997; Durch, 2006; Heldt, 2001; Kim, 2004;
Koko & Essis, 2012; Pushkina, 2006). Considering this mixed set of cases,
one may question whether their insights are applicable to post-civil war peace-
keeping. Another shortcoming is that most studies isolate variables from one
another. While some contributions do investigate the interplay between
security guaranties by third parties and powersharing (Walter, 2002) or
between peacekeeping and war outcome (Caplan & Hoeﬄer, 2017, pp. 147–
149), the quantitative methods they apply only allow for a small number of
interaction eﬀects to be considered. Identifying which combinations of con-
ditions lead to success or failure requires a more systematic consideration
of the interaction among various aspects of peacekeeping missions, along
with the peacekeeping environment. In light of this, I apply Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis (QCA)—a method designed to address the interplay
between conditions—to 22 peacekeeping missions deployed after civil wars,
all of which ended in the post-Cold War era.
This article rejects the widespread assumption that it is only the character-
istics of the peacekeeping mission itself that decide its outcome—a misjudg-
ment that can be found in prominent United Nations (UN) policy
documents. In identifying success factors for peacekeeping, the Capstone
Doctrine for instance lists impartiality, limited use of force, legitimacy, credi-
bility, and the promotion of national and local ownership (United Nations,
2008, pp. 31–40). The only factor it mentions beyond the mission proﬁle is
consent of the conﬂict parties, which is present in all cases considered in
this article. The so-called HIPPO-Report (Report of the High-Level Indepen-
dent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, para. 10) also ignores contextual
factors, stating that “there are outer limits for UN peacekeeping operations
deﬁned by their composition, character and inherent capability limitations.”
Academic contributions also conclude that the mission environment is of
minor importance for peacekeeping success. According to Martin-Brûlé
(2017, p. 2), “outcomes are better explained by the type of intervener and
the strategy employed than by the type of context.”
This article theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the peacekeep-
ing environment is, in fact, quite relevant in terms of the impact of peacekeep-
ing missions. Whether a civil war was fought between ethnically deﬁned
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parties, whether it was of high intensity, ended inconclusively or ended with a
military balance eﬀectively distinguishes cases of peace survival from those
with civil war recurrence. For cases in which most of the aforementioned
civil war characteristics were present, peace collapsed when the given peace-
keeping mission operated with a restrained approach. A “deliverable
mandate” or a “tailored mission,” as demanded by the Capstone Doctrine
(United Nations, 2008, p. 38) and the HIPPO-Report (Report of the High-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, para. 50–51), can only
be achieved when the role of contextual conditions is recognized.
The article commences with a theoretical discussion of how characteristics
deﬁning the peacekeeping environment and the peacekeeping mission are
related to peace survival and civil war recurrence. It then outlines the key
terms, the sample, method, and operationalization of the conditions. Using
QCA, the next section investigates the characteristics of terminated civil
wars. The QCA application also presents a summary of the peacekeeping
environment along with the features of the peacekeeping mission, highlight-
ing that restrained peacekeeping fails in adverse environments. The con-
clusion discusses implications for peacekeeping missions and further research.
Peacekeeping and civil war recurrence
The Brahimi Report, a prominent UN document published in 2000, makes the
case for peacekeeping contexts to be taken seriously. In deﬁning the environ-
ments of peace operations marked by greater or lesser degrees of danger, it
discusses the type of conﬂict, the extent of casualties and destruction, the
number of conﬂict parties, their aims and sources of income, and the role
of neighboring countries. The report concludes that it “is vitally important
that negotiators, the Security Council, Secretariat mission planners, and
mission participants alike understand which of these political-military
environments they are entering” (Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, 2000, para. 20–25, citation para. 26).1
Practitioners have also acknowledged the importance of conditions beyond
the peacekeeping mission itself. According to former U.S. diplomat Jett (2019,
p. 209), “[t]he fundamental—and often missing—factor is a true interest by
the parties in a lasting peace.” As Guéhenno (2015, p. 292), former UN
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, stresses, “the most
critical element for the success of a peacekeeping operation is the political
process that must underpin it.”2
Academic contributions likewise suggest that the peacekeeping environment
is relevant for the outcome. Many quantitative papers consider contextual
factors as control variables, including type of conﬂict, intensity, and the type
of war termination (e.g., Fortna, 2008, p. 119; Hultman et al., 2016, pp. 240–
245; Koko & Essis, 2012, p. 72). One study by Heldt (2001, p. 127) sets itself
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apart fromothers by concluding: “It is… the source of conﬂict or context, rather
than the nature of peacekeeping missions, that determines success.” Doyle and
Sambanis (2006, pp. 63–68) introduce an analytical triangle, highlighting the
interplay between the level of hostility, local capabilities, and international assist-
ance, including peacekeeping. They argue that the three “dimensions… substi-
tute for each other—more of one substitutes for less of another” (Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006, p. 64). Thus, “the more diﬃcult the peace process will be…
the more international assistance/authority will be needed” (Doyle & Sambanis,
2006, p. 65). Drawing from their approach, I assume that the proﬁle of the
peacekeeping mission does not suﬃce on its own for explaining why peacekeep-
ing succeeds or fails in preventing civil war recurrence.
In arguing that the peacekeeping context matters, I summarize what pre-
vious studies have identiﬁed as the “causal mechanisms of peacekeeping.” I
then address the question of how these mechanisms, and the prospects of
peace survival, are aﬀected by the peacekeeping environment. I subsequently
discuss attributes of peacekeeping missions with reference to these causal
mechanisms. Finally, the theoretical section deals with the interplay between
the peacekeeping environment and the proﬁle of the peacekeeping mission.
Causal mechanisms of peacekeeping
Fortna (2008, pp. 82–102) identiﬁes four “causal mechanisms of peacekeep-
ing” which I complement by insights from other authors. Causal mechanisms
are understood here as the ways in which peacekeeping preserves peace.
Fortna (2008, p. 86) stresses that “these mechanisms overlap in practice.”
The ﬁrst mechanism alters the conﬂict parties’ incentives for war and peace
by interpositioning peacekeepers between the warring parties. As one must
ﬁrst assault the peacekeepers in order to attack the opponent, strong peace-
keepers can deter or counter such aggression (Walter, 2002, pp. 26–27).
Peacekeeping also inﬂuences the incentives mentioned above by providing
the option of a “face-saving” withdrawal, allowing one conﬂict party to
claim that it has not given in to its opponent (James, 1969, p. 2).
Second, peacekeeping reduces uncertainty and fear. In consenting to peace-
keeping, a conﬂict party increases its costs for resorting to the military option,
thus signaling its intention for peace (James, 1969, pp. 92–93). Furthermore,
peacekeepers provide security guaranties and thereby alleviate the commitment
problem that can lead a peace process to collapse (Walter, 2002, p. 7, 14–27).
Such a problem exists when neither party to the conﬂict can credibly commit
to abiding by the provisions of an agreement, as each side knows that the
best outcome would be to breach the agreement while the adversary implements
it (Fearon, 1995, pp. 401–403). Peacekeepers can also serve as bodyguards for
vulnerable representatives of the conﬂict parties, granting them suﬃcient assur-
ance to participate in the peace process (Rikhye, 1984, p. 95).
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Through the third causal mechanism, peacekeepers prevent unintended
escalations by containing violent incidents at the local level (James, 1969,
p. 294). Fourth, peacekeepers establish a safe environment for civilian
peacebuilding.
The peacekeeping environment matters
The diﬃculty of peacekeeping varies by context: some environments provide
greater incentives for resuming war, along with more uncertainty and fear,
and increase the risks of an unintended escalation more than others.
Previous studies have highlighted two dimensions of the peacekeeping
environment: the ﬁrst relates to the characteristics of the terminated civil
war and the second includes post-war developments beyond peacekeeping.
I limit the analysis to the ﬁrst dimension, as it would exceed the scope of
this article to introduce multiple conditions for each dimension as well as
the war characteristics, the peacekeeping mission itself, and other post-war
developments. Another reason for opting to focus on this dimension is
that, when peacekeeping initiators plan a mission, they can rely more on
their knowledge of the civil war characteristics than on their expectations of
post-war developments.
I discuss characteristics of the terminated war with regard to their direct
relationship to civil war recurrence and their indirect impact on the causal
mechanisms by which peacekeeping missions are deemed to preserve peace.
Ethnic conﬂicts are taken to be particularly prone to recurrence (e.g.,
Kreutz, 2010, p. 248) due to the prolonged and larger amount of grievances
as well as opportunities for mobilization (Denny & Walter, 2014). As
ethnic bonds are especially stable and can more easily be mobilized than
other types of identity, these create stronger incentives for resuming war
while also sustaining fear on both sides. Unintended escalation is more
likely as ethnically deﬁned parties to the conﬂict are more willing to interpret
an incident as an assault on the entire group rather than as an isolated event.
Most previous studies have found that higher intensity makes civil war
recurrence more likely (e.g., Toft, 2010, p. 56). More intense conﬂicts
deepen cleavages and cause greater destruction, thereby intensifying incen-
tives for war such as grievances, the desire for revenge, and opportunities.
Additionally, more intense conﬂicts aﬀect a greater number of people, result-
ing in more widespread fear and belief in the enemy’s malicious intentions,
which exacerbates the commitment problem and the risk of unintended
escalation.
With regard to war outcome, a plurality of contributions concludes that
victories are better suited for preserving peace than peace agreements since
military triumphs destroy the organizational capabilities of the defeated
side (e.g., Licklider, 1995, p. 685). Other studies ﬁnd victories and peace
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agreements to have an equal eﬀect on preventing civil war recurrence when
compared to ceaseﬁres (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, pp. 87–88) or other war out-
comes (Meernik, Nichols, & King, 2010, pp. 317–318) such as “low activity”—
continued violence that does not surpass the threshold of 25 fatalities per
calendar year, as used by the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program (UCDP).3 A
higher degree of conclusiveness distinguishes peace agreements and victories
from other types of war termination (cf. Meernik et al., 2010, p. 324). The war
outcome oﬀers clues to the quality of what Guéhenno (2015, p. 292) calls the
underpinning political process. After failing to conclude a peace agreement,
each former warring party has less trust in the good will of its enemy. They
perceive mere ceaseﬁres and war termination due to low activity as less
binding than peace agreements, which not only regulate military behavior
but also address the political issues underlying the conﬂict. Furthermore, in
the absence of political concessions provided by peace agreements, the
parties to the conﬂict have less to lose and resuming the civil war is therefore
less costly. Inconclusive war endings create a particularly high level of uncer-
tainty about future arrangements, which impedes peacebuilding activities.
Finally, after inconclusive war terminations, the parties to the conﬂict tend
to possess more capabilities for resuming ﬁghting.
Some peace agreements are signed under the condition of military asym-
metry while others are concluded under a military balance. The distribution
of capabilities is deemed to be important considering that military balances
cause “conﬂicting expectations of what…war will be like” and therefore
makes war more likely (Blainey, 1973, p. 56). In contrast, clear asymmetry
implies concordant perceptions, which tend to preserve peace (Wagner,
1993, pp. 242–246). Moreover, military balances aggravate commitment pro-
blems and further unintended escalation: The parties will perceive that they
are more likely to obtain a decisive advantage by violating an agreement.
Overall, this discussion about the characteristics of the terminated civil war
with reference to the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping suggests that the
context does, in fact, matter for the outcome of peacekeeping.
The characteristics of terminated civil wars mentioned above were drawn
from studies that understand causality in probabilistic terms and marginally
investigate the interplay of conditions. As such, these contributions do not
provide insights into which of the possible combinations of these war charac-
teristics are related to peace survival or civil war recurrence. It would be far-
fetched to assume that one disadvantageous condition (e.g., an ethnic conﬂict
or a highly intense civil war) cancels out the negative impact of another (e.g.,
an inconclusive war ending or a military balance at war’s end) or impedes
another adverse condition from arising. It would be safe to assume that, as
the number of adverse war characteristics increases, the peacekeeping
environment becomes more diﬃcult. When such disadvantageous character-
istics are predominant, I refer to the aﬀected environment as “diﬃcult” or
464 T. GROMES
“adverse,” and otherwise as “easy” or “conducive.” Peacekeeping succeeds
when there are no more adverse than advantageous characteristics of the ter-
minated civil war.
Hypothesis 1: Peace survives when adverse civil war characteristics, an ethnic
conﬂict, high intensity, termination through a ceaseﬁre or “low activity,” and
a military balance at war’s end, do not outnumber advantageous conﬂict
characteristics.
Restrained peacekeeping only works in conducive environments
I now use the mechanisms of peacekeeping to discuss the features of a
mission. How well a mission alters the incentives for war and peace,
reduces uncertainty and fear, prevents unintended escalations, and establishes
a safe environment for civilian peacebuilding depends on the credibility and
capability of the peacekeepers. Credibility and capability are interrelated:
credibility is shaped by some aspects of capability such as the absolute or rela-
tive size of the deployment, the robustness of the mandate, troop training,
equipment, and the status of the key participating states (Walter, 2002, p. 41).
All else being equal, the more troops a peacekeeping force contains, the
more capable it will be at deterring or countering an aggressive act, at guar-
anteeing security by establishing large buﬀer zones, at signaling good inten-
tions, at containing local incidents, and at protecting individuals and
peacebuilding eﬀorts (Hultman et al., 2016, pp. 234–237).
Robust missions are mandated to use force for purposes beyond self-
defense. Robustness aims to alleviate uncertainty by signaling more resolve
for guaranteeing security and by making the peacekeepers less dependent
on the good will of the parties to the conﬂict. By giving their consent for
robust deployments, the parties can signal their good intentions. Robust man-
dates reduce incentives for war, in general, and for escalating local incidents,
in particular, by increasing the military costs of attacking. Moreover, robust
mandates facilitate a pro-active approach to establishing a safe environment
for civilian eﬀorts. On the other hand, robust missions require better
trained and equipped troops, they can provoke more resistance, including
attacks on civilian peacebuilders, and they are riskier for peacekeepers
(Hunt, 2018, pp. 151–160; Tardy, 2011, pp. 160–162).
Another discussion addresses the degree to which peacekeeping success
depends on the participation of particular actors. Some scholars argue that
success is enhanced when permanent members of the UN Security Council
(P5) assume a dominant role in the mission: these states introduce high mili-
tary capabilities and political resolve (Bratt, 1997, p. 54; Walter, 2002, p. 41).
Many studies discuss whether UN peacekeeping is less successful than mis-
sions carried out by other actors (e.g., Rikhye, 1984, p. 239). UN missions are
deemed to be more impartial but also exhibit less morale and resolve, less
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expertise about the aﬀected region, poorer organization, and lower military
quality compared to deployments by regional organizations or coalitions of
willing states (Durch, 2006, pp. 582–588; Malan, 2018, p. 39; Martin-Brûlé,
2017, p. 10). As discussed, high capabilities and resolve help fulﬁll the tasks
related to the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping.
In the following, high troop density, a robust mandate and dominance by a
P5 member are what deﬁnes a strong peacekeeping posture. In contrast, a low
troop-to-population ratio, a mandate conﬁned to self-defense, and a non-P5
state assuming a leading role in the mission constitute restrained peacekeep-
ing or peacekeeping “lite.”4 Depending on which features preponderate, a
mission is labeled strong or restrained.
Compared to a strong posture, restrained peacekeeping has less inﬂuence
on the incentives for war and peace, it is less eﬀective at reducing uncertainty
and fear, it is more limited in containing local escalations, and it is less capable
of safeguarding civilian eﬀorts. When an easy environment compensates for
the smaller potential of a restrained peacekeeping mission, peace survives.
But when the characteristics of a diﬃcult environment preponderate
(ethnic conﬂict, high intensity, an inconclusive war termination, and a mili-
tary balance at war’s end), the proﬁle of the peacekeeping mission must com-
pensate. Consequently, peacekeeping lite does not suﬃce for preventing civil
war recurrence in diﬃcult environments.
Hypothesis 2: Restrained peacekeeping only prevents civil war recurrence when
advantageous conﬂict characteristics are not outnumbered by adverse
characteristics.
Strong peacekeeping is needed to compensate for adverse contexts
Compared to restrained peacekeeping, a comprehensive mission with a robust
mandate led by a powerful state has greater inﬂuence on the former warring
parties’ incentives for war and peace and on the level of uncertainty and fear.
It has more capacities to respond to local escalations and support peacebuild-
ing activities. Thus, peacekeeping missions with a strong posture can compen-
sate for a diﬃcult environment where the parties to the conﬂict are more
willing and more capable to resume war.
Hypothesis 3: For contexts in which adverse civil war characteristics preponde-
rate, peace only survives when a strong peacekeeping mission is deployed.
Hypothesis 2 seems to imply Hypothesis 3. But, conceivably, the empirical
analysis only supports the former and not the latter. I therefore state two sep-
arate hypotheses.
Drawing from Doyle and Sambanis (2006, p. 64), I argue that diﬃcult con-
texts, in contrast to easy environments, need to be compensated by missions
with a strong posture to ensure lasting peace. While strong peacekeeping is
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not needed in an easy environment, it is also not a threat to peace survival
here. As indicated above, a particularly strong mission can provoke violent
resistance from the conﬂict parties. In an easy environment, however, the
parties have fewer causes and opportunities for such a resistance.
Hypothesis 4: Peace survives when peacekeeping missions with a strong posture
operate in easy environments.
Research design
Key terms
Peacekeeping is the deployment of armed troops or unarmed military obser-
vers in a third country with the aim of preventing the resumption of hostilities
(cf. Fortna, 2008, p. 5). This article only deals with post-civil war peacekeeping
and its military component.
Civil war is deﬁned as armed intrastate conﬂict in which at least 1,000 lives
have been lost in battles or assaults throughout the period of ﬁghting. Apart
from the number of battle-related deaths from state-based conﬂicts, this
deﬁnition also considers victims of one-sided violence against civilians and
those due to non-state conﬂicts, provided that one of the parties of the
state-based conﬂict participated in such violence. The sample is based on
UCDP datasets.5
A civil war is considered terminated when the threshold of 25 fatalities has
not been surpassed for at least one year—for state-based conﬂicts, non-state
conﬂicts, and one-sided violence. Civil war recurrence is conceptualized in
a strict sense, meaning that the new war involves the same warring parties,
concerns the same issues and leads to at least 1,000 fatalities in a state-
based conﬂict, a related non-state conﬂict or one-sided violence.
Cases
The dynamics of terminating civil wars and building peace have signiﬁcantly
changed since the end of the Cold War (Merz, 2012, p. 204). In the current
era, civil wars have more often ended in peace agreements (Kreutz, 2010,
p. 246). At the same time, peacekeeping missions have become more frequent
and robust, comprise more personnel, and exhibit a multidimensional range
of activities (see e.g., Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015, pp. 2–3,
262–263; Bellamy & Williams, 2015, pp. 14–15, 29–30). In focusing on civil
wars terminated after 1990, this article stands by the claim made by Wallens-
teen (2015, p. 97) that “the Cold War experiences are… irrelevant for post-
Cold War undertakings.” It considers civil war terminations until the end
of 2009, allowing time for observing whether peace collapsed in the sub-
sequent years for each case considered.
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Relying on data compiled by Fortna (2008), Mullenbach’s dataset for Third
Party Peacekeeping Missions (2013) and case-speciﬁc literature, I identify 22
post-civil war peacekeeping missions in 17 countries. I code cases as single
missions when an operation has been renamed or when the executing organ-
ization has changed. Developments are traced until the resumption of civil
war, or for the ﬁrst seven post-war years, if peace has endured. This time
span captures all seven resumptions that occurred until 2012, while losing
only two cases of peace survival with an investigation period shorter than
seven years. Civil war recurred despite the presence of a peacekeeping
mission in six cases and recurred following the withdrawal of peacekeepers
in one case.
Cases with peace survival Cases with civil war recurrence
1. Bosnia–Herzegovina (Croats) 1993–1994
2. Bosnia–Herzegovina (Serbs) 1992–1995
3. Burundi (National Council for Defence of
Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
1994–2004
4. Croatia 19956
5. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
(Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC)) 1998–
2002
6. El Salvador 1980–1991
7. Georgia (Abkhazia) 1992–1993
8. Guatemala 1965–1995
9. Indonesia (Aceh) 1999–2005
10. Liberia 2000–2003
11. Mozambique 1977–1992
12. Nicaragua 1982–1990
13. Sierra Leone 1991–2000
14. Tajikistan 1992–1996
15. Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 1998–1999
1. Angola (National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola) 1975–1995
2. DRC (Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Démocratie du Peuple (RCD)) 1998–2004
3. DRC (Congrès national pour la défense du
peuple (CNDP)) 2006–2009
4. Liberia 1989–1996
5. Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers) 1983–2001
6. Sudan (Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLA)) 1983–2004
7. Yugoslavia/Croatia 1991–1993
Method
Peace survival versus civil war recurrence does not necessarily depend on a
single condition or one combination of conditions. Various paths may lead
to stable peace or resumed civil war. QCA has been designed to uncover
diﬀerent causal paths that may each combine several conditions. This
method presumes that causation can be “conjunctural.” While sociology
was the ﬁrst area that widely applied QCA, this method is also gaining recog-
nition in peace research and security studies (e.g., Binder, 2015; Haesebrouck,
2018). QCA prefers the notion of “conditions” over “independent variables”
and “outcome” over “dependent variable.”
QCA serves to identify necessity and suﬃciency for a particular outcome
(Ragin, 1987; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). An ethnic conﬂict, for
instance, proves necessary for civil war recurrence if each resumed civil
war is an ethnic conﬂict. An ethnic conﬂict will prove suﬃcient for civil
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war recurrence if each ethnic conﬂict results in resumed civil war. To stress
the interest in necessity and suﬃciency, users increasingly label QCA as a
set-theoretic method.
As the outcome is understood as dichotomous (civil war recurrence vs.
peace survival), I follow a recommendation by Ragin (2014, p. 90), QCA’s
developer, and use crisp-set QCA for which all conditions are binary.
Selection and operationalization of conditions
The conceptual section has introduced conditions that fulﬁll two require-
ments. First, they are based on sound theoretical reasoning and, second,
they prove promising in light of the empirical data. The second requirement
is needed as even the best theory will prove useless if the values of the corre-
sponding condition remain constant or nearly constant for all cases con-
sidered.7 Such a condition cannot contribute to the explanation, even if
combined with other factors: The QCA algorithm will exclude it due to redun-
dancy (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009, p. 28).
Table A1 in the online appendix8 summarizes the raw data for all con-
ditions and the outcome. I use data compiled by a larger research project
on civil war recurrence in assigning the values for all conditions related to
the characteristics of the terminated civil war. The project’s dataset is based
on case descriptions9 that document all sources and coding decisions
(Gromes & Ranft, 2016). All codings for these conditions rely on assessments
in the case-speciﬁc literature, with any exceptions indicated.
The condition “ethnic conﬂict” designates whether a civil war was waged
between ethnically deﬁned conﬂict parties. The condition on relative war
intensity is dichotomized at 2.5% of the pre-war population (“intensity2.5”).
For the war outcome, this analysis does not juxtapose victories and peace
accords as is common in previous studies. Such a juxtaposition ignores that
the war outcomes ceaseﬁre and “low activity” occur just as frequently as vic-
tories in my sample. The QCA application compares conclusive and inconclu-
sive war endings. The condition “no accord no victory” is coded with 1 if the
war ended in a ceaseﬁre or “low activity” and with 0 in cases of a peace agree-
ment or victory.
The condition “balance” aggregates several military balance indicators at
the end of the civil war: whether one side won the war, the extent of rebel-con-
trolled territory, the rebels’ relative ﬁghting capacity, whether both sides could
have continued ﬁghting at the end of the war, and whether one side killed or
captured its opponent’s political leader. Relevant datasets and case-speciﬁc
sources were used to assess these aspects.10 Combined, the indicators deﬁne
a spectrum with three segments of equal scope: the middle segment marks
a military balance (value 1), while the two outer sectors represent military
imbalance favoring the government or the rebels (value 0).
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Table A1 in the online appendix documents the properties of the peace-
keeping missions, including the maximum number of deployed troops or
unarmed observers (according to Mullenbach, 2013). As 10,000 troops in a
small state signal more resolve and relative military capability than the
same number in a large country, I relate the number of troops to the mean
size of the population in the post-war period and to the size of the target
country. If the conﬂict is limited to parts of a country, only the aﬀected popu-
lation or area is considered. No theoretical considerations guide the dichoto-
mization of these conditions for which the raw data is metrically scaled. QCA
literature recommends identifying leaps in the raw data to avoid thresholds
that would otherwise classify cases with similar values into diﬀerent cat-
egories. Moreover, dichotomization must ensure that both categories
contain a considerable number of cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, pp. 28, 42,
93, 125). Values for the troop-to-population ratio (“troops per capita”) are
dichotomized using a threshold of 300 troops per 100,000 inhabitants. The
threshold for dichotomizing the troop-to-space ratio (“troops space”) is set
at 100 troops per 1,000 km².11
The dichotomization of the condition “robust” is based on Fortna’s research
and on relevant sources such as UN Security Council resolutions for recent
cases. The dominant role of a P5 state (“P5”) is given when such a state is ident-
iﬁed as a mission’s lead state in Mullenbach’s peacekeeping dataset. A UN
mission (“UN”) is provided when the UN conducts the operation. The compi-
lations by Fortna and Mullenbach, along with documents found on the UN
website, were used as the main sources for coding this condition.
Analysis of the peacekeeping environment
QCA must ﬁrst identify necessary conditions and then suﬃcient conditions
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 115). As Table A4 in the online appendix
shows, civil war termination through a peace agreement or victory proves
quasi necessary for peace survival. Nicaragua is the exception that conﬁrms
the rule: although no formal peace agreement settled the political issues at
stake, the war ended conclusively. When the civil war was terminated
through a ceaseﬁre, the former Sandinista government had already accepted
the process of political transition and lost power in elections.
A military balance at war’s end only minimally fulﬁlls the requirements of a
necessary condition for civil war recurrence.
I now turn to the analysis of suﬃciency.12 This article claims that the
peacekeeping context matters for the success or failure of peacekeeping mis-
sions. This assumption would be supported if we ﬁnd that the conditions of
the peacekeeping environment eﬀectively distinguish cases of peace survival
and instances of civil war recurrence. As will be shown, this criterion is
fulﬁlled.
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Hypothesis 1 speciﬁes the general claim by stating that peace survives when
advantageous civil war characteristics are not outnumbered by adverse
characteristics. Table 1 presents the results of the analysis of suﬃciency
with regard to peace survival. Before discussing these results I outline how
to read them.
The solution consists of four paths, which, combined, cover 14 out of 15
cases of peace survival, implying solution coverage rate of 93.3%. The paths
depict combinations of conditions that consistently relate to the outcome.
An asterisk indicates which conditions are combined and the tilde designates
the negation of the condition: “∼intensity2.5,” for instance, represents
conﬂicts with relatively low intensity.
Path 1 describes civil wars of relatively low intensity terminated through a
peace agreement or victory. The paths result from ﬁltering conﬁgurations (i.e.,
combinations of conditions) consistently related to the outcome under inves-
tigation. These conﬁgurations are then compared to identify dispensable con-
ditions. In Path 1, the condition that indicates ethnic conﬂicts proves
expendable, as some covered cases were ethnic conﬂicts while others were
not. The same holds true for a military balance at war’s end.
The consistency (100%) in Path 1 indicates the portion of cases that experi-
enced lasting peace. Conﬁgurations must exhibit consistency of at least 75% to
be considered in the suﬃciency analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012,
p. 127).
Path 1 describes 73% of all cases of lasting peace (raw coverage). Since it
overlaps all other paths, the portion of cases it exclusively covers (unique cov-
erage) is 20%. Due to this overlap, the sum of the raw coverages of all paths is
higher than the solution coverage (0.933) and even higher than 1.
Path 2 covers ethnic conﬂicts with a military imbalance at the end of a war
terminated through a peace agreement or victory. On Path 3, non-ethnic
Table 1. Suﬃciency analysis for peace survival.
Conditions: ethnic conﬂict, intensity2.5, balance, no accord no victory
Solution consistency: 1.000, solution coverage: 0.933 (Burundi not covered)
Paths
Consis-
tency Consistent cases
Raw
coverage
Unique
coverage
1) ∼intensity2.5*∼no accord
no victory
1.000 Bosnia-H. (Serbs), Bosnia-H.
(Croats), Croatia 2, DRC MLC, El
Salvador, Georgia, Indonesia,
Liberia 2, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan,
Yugoslavia
0.733 0.200
2) ethnic conﬂict*∼balance
*∼no accord no victory
1.000 Croatia 2, Georgia, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Yugoslavia
0.333 0.067
3) ∼ethnic conﬂict *balance*
∼no accord no victory
1.000 DRC MLC, El Salvador,
Mozambique
0.200 0.067
4) ∼ethnic conﬂict*
∼intensity2.5 * ∼balance
1.000 Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan 0.200 0.067
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conﬂicts with a military balance at the end of a war terminated through a
peace agreement or victory are consistently related to peace survival. Path 4
represents non-ethnic conﬂicts of lower intensity and a military imbalance
at war’s end. The type of war termination is not part of this conﬁguration
as, for this aspect, Nicaragua (ceaseﬁre) deviates from Sierra Leone and Taji-
kistan (peace agreement respectively).
I now discuss the results. Expressed in set-theoretic terms, with regard to
suﬃciency, Hypothesis 1 states that cases with a peacekeeping environment
in which no or no more than two adverse civil war characteristics are given
are a subset of all cases with peace survival. This implies that if Hypothesis
1 is correct, the paths to lasting peace in Table 1 should include no or only
a few disadvantageous civil war characteristics. Indeed, Path 1 and Path 4
exhibit no condition in an adverse form and, on Paths 2 and 3, only one
civil war characteristic appears in its disadvantageous form. The single
uncovered case of peace survival is Burundi, an ethnic conﬂict of high
intensity with a military balance at war’s end terminated through a peace
agreement. In this deviating case, three conditions were given in their
disadvantageous form. The reason why peace lasted here will be discussed
later on.
Overall, the analysis of peace survival supports Hypothesis 1. This hypoth-
esis would be additionally corroborated if the analysis with regard to civil war
recurrence shows that cases in which adverse civil war characteristics prepon-
derate are a subset of all cases with the resumption of civil war. Paths consist-
ently related to the collapse of peace should exhibit a preponderance of
adverse civil war characteristics. The results presented in Table 2 correspond
to this.
The single path covers ﬁve out of seven cases of resumed civil war and
describes ethnic conﬂicts with a military balance at the end of a war termi-
nated through a ceaseﬁre or due to low activity. The path combines three dis-
advantageous conditions.
In total, the paths to peace survival or civil war recurrence cover 19 out of
the 22 cases. As expected, conducive environments are associated with
peace survival, whereas contexts in which adverse civil war characteristics
preponderate relate to civil war recurrence. These ﬁndings support
Hypothesis 1.13
Table 2. Suﬃciency analysis for civil war recurrence.
Conditions: ethnic conﬂict, intensity2.5, balance, no accord no victory
Solution consistency: 1.000, solution coverage: 0.714 (Liberia 1, Sudan not covered)
Paths
Consis-
tency Consistent cases
Raw
coverage
Unique
coverage
1) ethnic conﬂict*balance*no
accord no victory
1.000 Angola, DRC CNDP, DRC
RCD, Sri Lanka, Croatia 1
0.714 0.714
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Analysis of diﬀerent peacekeeping proﬁles in diﬀerent
environments
Since Tables 1 and 2 do not directly show the presence of a peacekeeping
mission, one should keep in mind that the sample exclusively consists of
peacekeeping cases. Next, the analysis combines civil war characteristics
with diﬀerent peacekeeping postures. With a total of 22 cases, the number
of conditions that can be concurrently investigated is limited to ﬁve (Marx
& Dusa, 2011, p. 114); including all four contextual conditions and all four
peacekeeping conditions is inadmissible. One established approach for redu-
cing the number of conditions is summarizing them (Ragin, 2000, pp. 321–
328). To do so, I deﬁne a more abstract condition that distinguishes
between more or less challenging peacekeeping environments. Based on the
numbers in Tables 1, 2, and A4 (in the online appendix), the summarizing
condition “adverse context” obtains the value 0 if no more than two out of
four civil war characteristics are given in their disadvantageous form, and
otherwise a value of 1.14 The integrated analysis combines “adverse
context” with four peacekeeping conditions that relate to the mandate
(“robust”), troop density (“troops per capita”), and actor (“P5” and “UN”).
None of these peacekeeping conditions proves necessary for peace survival
(see Table A4 in the online appendix).
Table 3 presents the integrated results of the suﬃciency analysis for peace
survival. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, there should be one or more paths on
which restrained peacekeeping operates in a non-adverse environment.
Hypothesis 3 would be corroborated if no path exists to lasting peace with
a diﬃcult context and peacekeeping lite. Paths exhibiting strong peacekeeping
in easy environments would be in accordance with Hypothesis 4.
The solution is perfectly consistent and covers all cases of peace survival
except Burundi, which exhibits an adverse context. All three paths exhibit a
conducive peacekeeping environment. On Path 1, none of the attributes of
a strong peacekeeping posture is a necessary part of this conﬁguration that
Table 3. Integrated suﬃciency analysis for peace survival.
Conditions: adverse context, UN, P5, troops per capita, robust
Solution consistency: 1.000, solution coverage: 0.933 (Burundi not covered)
Paths
Consis-
tency Consistent cases
Raw
coverage
Unique
coverage
1) ∼adverse context*∼P5*
∼troops per capita*∼robust
1.000 El Salvador, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Mozambique,
Nicaragua
0.333 0.333
2) ∼adverse context*∼UN*P5*
troops per capita
1.000 Bosnia-H. (Serbs), Bosnia-H.
(Croats), Georgia, Tajikistan,
Yugoslavia
0.333 0.333
3) ∼adverse context*UN*∼P5*
robust
1.000 Croatia 2, DRC MLC, Liberia 2,
Sierra Leone
0.267 0.267
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is suﬃcient for lasting peace. On Path 3, robust UN missions in conducive
contexts consistently relate to peacekeeping success. As Paths 1 and 3 show,
restrained peacekeeping works in favorable contexts—a ﬁnding that supports
Hypothesis 2.
Path 2 represents cases combining a conducive context with peacekeeping
missions featuring high troop density and led by a P5 state. A strong peace-
keeping posture is not counterproductive in conducive environments. This
is in line with Hypothesis 4.
As implied by Hypotheses 2 and 3, no conﬁguration exists combining a
diﬃcult context and restrained peacekeeping that is consistently related to
peace survival. However, there is no path that supports Hypothesis 3 in
stating that peace needs a strong mission to endure in an adverse
environment.
Table 4 presents the results of the integrated analysis of suﬃcient con-
ditions for civil war recurrence.15 All resumptions took place in an adverse
context. On the ﬁrst three paths, none of the attributes of a strong peacekeep-
ing posture are a necessary part of conﬁgurations suﬃcient for resumed civil
war. This accords with Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4.
Path 4 exhibits a robust mission with high troop density. At ﬁrst sight, this
would suggest that even a strong peacekeeping posture fails in adverse con-
texts—a ﬁnding that would reject Hypothesis 3. However, the ﬁrst peacekeep-
ing mission in Liberia described by Path 4 had already withdrawn when civil
war recurred. As it was pulled too early, this does not demonstrate that strong
peacekeeping also fails in challenging environments.
While peacekeeping lite has nearly always failed in diﬃcult contexts, the
question as to whether peacekeeping with a strong posture can preserve
peace in challenging environments remains open. The data does not
contain such a conﬁguration.
In total, the QCA results support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 but cannot
conﬁrm Hypothesis 3.
Table 4. Integrated suﬃciency analysis for civil war recurrence.
Conditions: adverse context, UN, P5, troops per capita, robust
Solution consistency: 0.875, solution coverage: 1.000
Paths
Consis-
tency Consistent cases
Raw
coverage
Unique
coverage
1) adverse context*UN*∼P5* ∼troops
per capita
0.800 Angola, DRC CNDP,
DRC RCD, Sudan
deviant case Burundi
0.571 0.429
2) adverse context*∼P5*∼troops per
capita*∼robust
1.000 Angola, Sri Lanka 0.286 0.143
3) adverse context*UN*∼P5* ∼robust 1.000 Angola, Croatia 1 0.286 0.143
4) adverse context*∼UN*∼P5* troops
per capita*robust
1.000 Liberia 1 0.143 0.143
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The deviating case of Burundi indicates that peace can survive in adverse
contexts even when restrained peacekeeping is in place. To make sense of
this deviation, one can consider conditions beyond civil war characteristics
and the peacekeeping proﬁle. A look at further post-war developments docu-
mented in the dataset for post-civil war orders reveals some diﬀerences
between Burundi and the other cases with the same conﬁguration (Path 1
in Table 4). These can be used to explain why peace lasted in Burundi.
Here, the former warring parties did not maintain separate forces throughout
the post-civil war period. Moreover, Burundi was less autocratic than the
other cases and exhibited a particularly far-reaching form of powersharing,
including veto rights.
The ﬁnding that contextual conditions matter raises the question of whether
peacekeeping makes a diﬀerence at all. If peace proves just as stable in condu-
cive environments without peacekeeping as in conducive contexts with peace-
keeping missions, one may conclude that peacekeeping is not needed. However,
such an inference is inadmissible as the contextual conditions in cases with
peacekeeping systematically diﬀer from those in cases without such missions.
In the dataset used for this analysis, a peacekeeping mission followed each
civil war terminated by a peace agreement. Moreover, peacekeepers were
deployed in 80% of the cases with a military balance at war’s end, whereas
peacekeeping was carried out in less than one-third of cases with a military
imbalance at this time (for more details, see Tables A13–A22 in the online
appendix). The ﬁndings presented here do not support the interpretation
that peacekeeping only works in contexts where it is not needed.
Conclusion
As comparative studies have mainly addressed the question of “does peace-
keeping work?,” this article shifts the focus to combinations of conditions
that allow peacekeeping to succeed. The ﬁndings stand opposed to the Cap-
stone Doctrine (United Nations, 2008, pp. 31–40) and to the Report of the
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (2015, para. 10) that
discuss prospects for success (almost) exclusively with regard to peacekeeping
proﬁles. This article shows that contextual conditions matter for peacekeeping
success. Missions with a restrained approach succeed in advantageous con-
texts but fail in diﬃcult environments. Such peacekeeping lite is deﬁned by
the presence of most or all of the following: a non-robust mandate, low
troop density, and a lack of dominance by a P5 state. An adverse context is
given when the following characteristics of the terminated civil war are pre-
dominant: ethnic conﬂict, high intensity, a military balance at war’s end,
and civil war termination via ceaseﬁre or due to low activity.
A conclusive civil war termination (a peace agreement or a military
victory) is necessary for peace survival. For cases with peacekeeping, this
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ﬁnding contradicts the conventional wisdom that victories are better suited
for preserving peace than are peace agreements.
Although missions with a strong posture do no harm in relatively condu-
cive environments, decision-makers should opt for deploying restrained
peacekeeping in such contexts. These missions demand fewer resources, are
less risky than strong peacekeeping, and prove equally eﬀective. Whether or
not a strong peacekeeping posture will preserve peace despite an adverse
context remains an open question, as my data lacks this conﬁguration.
The considerable number of failed peacekeeping missions should inspire
more studies on conditions that lead to success or failure. Further studies
could extend the analysis to recent cases and armed conﬂicts with fewer
than 1,000 fatalities. As my contribution limits itself to one dimension of
the peacekeeping context (characteristics of the terminated civil war), future
studies could (also) consider post-war conditions beyond peacekeeping,
such as powersharing, the level of democracy or armed conﬂict in neighboring
countries. With regard to the peacekeeping proﬁle, I incorporated conditions
that distinguish between restrained and strong peacekeeping. Alternatively,
studies could focus on the composition or other aspects of peacekeeping mis-
sions. Nevertheless, any way one analytically models the peacekeeping proﬁle,
the highlighted civil war characteristics will continue to exert a strong
inﬂuence on the peacekeeping outcome—at least for the cases and the speciﬁ-
cations used here.
Notes
1. It also highlights the diﬀerence between peacekeeping during and after armed
conﬂict. More recent UN papers conﬁrm the key diﬀerence between the
environment of traditional peacekeeping and more challenging contexts with
no peace to keep (Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Oper-
ations, 2015, para. 23, 104). This diﬀerence is not relevant for this article, which
exclusively addresses post-civil war peacekeeping.
2. Guéhenno (2015, p. 88) also writes “the main problem is the lack of political
will” among the member states.
3. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/deﬁnitions.
4. Implicitly, these deﬁnitions also consider whether the UN conducts a mission.
As Table A1 in the online appendix shows, no UNmission is dominated by a P5
member.
5. http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
6. According to UCDP, war-related violence in Croatia lasted from July 1991 until
a ceaseﬁre came into force in late 1993. In 1995, the conﬂict re-escalated but the
number of fatalities remained narrowly below the threshold of 1,000. Strictly
speaking, no civil war recurred and only one peacekeeping mission took
place. Such an approach, however, ignores the drastic change in the situation
in 1995 when Croatia’s government defeated the forces of the self-proclaimed
Republika Srpska Krajina. To account for the fact that peacekeeping after this
victory operated on a very diﬀerent basis, I code two missions in Croatia.
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7. Authorization by the UN Security Council, consent by the conﬂict parties, and
peacekeeping outlasting the ﬁrst post-civil war election are (nearly) constant
conditions. The online appendix (Table A3) documents these and other con-
ditions that are not considered in the analysis.
8. https://www.hsfk.de/ﬁleadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/peacekeeping-appen
dix.pdf.
9. https://www.hsfk.de/publikationen/working-paper-33-case-descriptions/.
10. For details see: https://www.hsfk.de/ﬁleadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/
Codebook-post-civil-war-power-and-compromise.pdf.
11. Table A2 in the online appendix sorts the values for all metric conditions.
12. The online appendix presents all truth tables. All analyses were done with
fsQCA 2.5. As I exclude “logical remainders,” the complex solution corre-
sponds to the intermediate solution and the parsimonious solution.
13. Tables A7 and A8 in the online appendix replace relative intensity (“inten-
sity2.5”) with absolute intensity (“50000 deaths”). The results are largely the
same for peace survival and match perfectly with regard to civil war recurrence.
14. While “adverse context” is necessary for civil war recurrence, an easy peace-
keeping environment is necessary for peace survival, as Table A4 in the
online appendix shows.
15. Tables A11 and A12 in the online appendix show that the results hardly change
when the troop-to-population ratio is replaced by the troop-to-space ratio.
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